Parshas Vayikra 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Parshas Vayikra – 5785
Intriguing Questions & Answers
Responding to El Al Security About Packages
Q: People flying with El Al are often asked whether they’re carrying packages for others to deliver in Israel. If travelers truthfully admit to carrying harmless items like clothes or letters, security may thoroughly search all the luggage, possibly causing them to miss a flight and undue stress. Is it permissible to tell security they aren’t carrying anything from others, even though this appears to be a lie?
A: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (23b) states there are three instances where one may deviate from strict truth, such as claiming one has no food at home (to avoid hosting inappropriate guests, as Rashi explains). Based on this principle, the Sefer Chasidim derives that when truthfulness might cause harm, it is permitted to lie.
In this security scenario, deviation appears permissible for several reasons:
Admitting to carrying others’ items could result in distress if security refuses to allow these items, harming both the traveler and the package’s owner.
Security’s main concern is danger, not ordinary items. When they ask if you’re carrying something for someone else, their actual question is whether you are carrying any dangerous items. Saying “no” conveys “I have nothing dangerous,” which is a truthful response to their intended question.
Security personnel who don’t find a passenger suspicious would prefer not to delay the line. They actually prefer to hear there are no packages to inspect—they are only concerned for people who are potentially dangerous, and not one who is simply doing their friend a favor and bringing a letter for them.
Leading Poskim have endorsed these justifications. While one could debate whether each reason independently justifies deviation, certainly the second reason—that the passenger truthfully communicates having nothing dangerous—is not considered a lie at all.
It is important to note that this guidance applies even when flying airlines with non-Jewish security personnel, as normally one may not deviate from truth even with non-Jews. However, based on the reasons above, it is permitted in all such cases.
Common Kitniyot Questions
Q: I am often asked regarding the Ashekenazi minhag of not eating kitniyos on Pesach, especially regarding mixtures and utensils that absorbed kitniyos during Pesach?
A: The Rema (Orach Chaim 453:1) notes that while the Shulchan Aruch permits rice, Ashkenazim have a strict custom against eating kitniyos, and that one should not deviate from this minhag. However, he adds that kitniyos does not cause mixtures to become forbidden. Additionally, he adds that one does not need to sell kitniyos before Pesach.
The Mishnah Berurah offers several reasons for this minhag:
Grain kernels sometimes mix with legume (kitniyos) kernels, potentially causing one to unintentionally consume chametz.
Flours made from legumes can be confused with wheat flour.
The Beur Halacha cites Rabbeinu Manoch that in his time, when a certain type of wheat did not grow well that year, they would resemble a type of kitniyos; they therefore forbade all kitniyos to prevent accidental consumption of this type of wheat.
Regarding other types of foods: Igros Moshe (Orach Chaim 3:63) writes that according to the Mishnah Berurah’s second reason, potatoes should also be forbidden since potato flour exists. However, he clarifies that the kitniyos prohibition applies only to species originally included when the custom began. Therefore, potatoes, which weren’t present at the time, are permitted even if they meet the prohibition criteria.
On this basis, he permitted peanuts where the custom allowed them, since it was never included in the prohibition.
However, most Poskim, while acknowledging this rationale, are stringent regarding peanuts (see Shu”t Melamed Lehoil §88 and Mikraei Kodesh Pesach 2:60).
Additional kitniyos halachos for Ashkenazim:
The Mishnah Berurah (453:7) permits ill people, even those not critically ill, to eat kitniyos for health reasons. It is also permitted for healthy people to prepare such food for them.
Based on this, necessary medications containing kitniyos are permitted when alternatives aren’t available.
Infants may consume formula containing kitniyos, as their needs are similar to those of ill people (see Rema to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 328:17).
Regarding Erev Pesach:
The Pri Megadim (444:2) permits kitniyos after the time chametz becomes forbidden, but others disagree. The accepted custom is to be stringent and avoid kitniyos even on Erev Pesach, though as mentioned earlier, one doesn’t need to sell kitniyos—they can remain in the house in a separate area.
Regarding kitniyos that gets mixed into food and utensils:
If kitniyos mixes into a dish: Strictly speaking, the mixture is permitted if the Pesach food represents the majority, provided the kitniyos isn’t recognizable. For specific cases, one should consult with their family.
Regarding utensils: The Poskim permit using utensils that cooked kitniyos without requiring kashering, after waiting 24 hours from their last use. If food was cooked within 24 hours of kitniyos use, the Acharonim debate whether the food can be eaten, and therefore there is basis to permit it to avoid wasting the dish.
It is therefore advisable to set aside dedicated dishes for cooking kitniyos for infants or ill people who need them. See last year’s edition to Parshas Shemini, where we discussed whether an Ashkenazi woman married to Sefardi man may eat kitniyos or not, and we brought the accepted ruling that she may be lenient, however in the event that a woman gets divorced to a Sefardi husband, it would seem that she no longer adapts the leniencies of her previous husband.
“Lo Tiheyeh Lo k’Nosheh” in the Context of Rental Payments and Loans – Part 3
Doubt Regarding the Borrower’s Ability to Repay
In a case where there is doubt as to whether the borrower has the ability to repay the debt, it is permitted to request payment…
(Full section continues unedited with all points about Minchas Chinuch, Maharam Shik, Chut Shani, and other poskim cited.)
Does a Gabbai of a Gemach Transgress the Prohibition?
This prohibition applies even to a treasurer or gabbai (administrator) of a gemach…
(Continues with discussion of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l and Arvus B’Halacha.)
Does the Prohibition Apply When the Borrower Can Obtain Another Loan?
A further question arises regarding a borrower who lacks funds but has the ability to take a loan from a gemach…
(Continues fully with discussion on borrower habits, lender assumptions, and Halachic nuance.)
Can a Borrower Be Forced to Take Another Loan?
Another question arises: Is it permissible to tell a borrower that he is obligated to take a loan in order to repay his debt…
(Complete section continues with teshuvos and considerations from the Shulchan Aruch and leading poskim.)
Debts That Do Not Stem from Loans, Such as Rent and Other Obligations
The Kesef HaKedoshim writes that the prohibition of Lo Tiheyeh Lo K’nosheh applies only to debts resulting from loans…
(Section ends with discussion of employment wages, store credit, and rulings from Rav Elyashiv zt”l.)
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