Parshas Shemos – 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Parshas Shemos 5785
Intriguing Questions & Answers
Is It Better to Daven Alone or in a Shul Without a Mechitzah?
Q: I was recently asked by someone who was traveling on vacation and staying in a place where the only Shul did not have a mechitzah: Is it better for him to daven at home alone, or in the Shul with a minyan but without a mechitzah? Although the questioner was from America, and I suggested consulting the local Rabbanim there, he insisted on hearing my humble opinion here in Eretz Yisroel, based on what I received from the gedolei horaah shlit”a, here in Eretz Yisroel.
A: Chazal in various places teach us that wherever there is a gathering of men and women—for example, in a Shul for tefillah or a place for Torah shiurim—there is an obligation to have a mechitzah between them. This is stated in the Gemara in Sukkah (52b), which discusses the prohibition of mingling between men and women because it leads to sin. For example, during the Simchas Beis HaShoevah, they made a “tikkun gadol”—a balcony for women to prevent mingling. Similarly, even at funerals, mingling and frivolity are to be avoided. The Gemara there also states that a Shul must have a mechitzah separating men and women. See also Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim, 1:41.
Even in non-religious settings, such as vacation programs with mixed activities, there is seemingly an obligation to have a mechitzah. See also Taz in Orach Chaim (315:1), who states that during a derashah, there must be a mechitzah between men and women. However, for the sake of kiruv, some are lenient when delivering shiurim to mixed audiences, based on “Eis laasos la’Hashem heifeiru Torasecha,” as explained by the Chazon Ish (Orach Chaim 16:11) regarding reciting krias shema in the presence of uncovered hair.
The extent of this obligation depends on the context. In events like weddings or Simchas Torah, where the yetzer hara might be stronger, it is highly recommended to establish mechitzos to minimize temptation. Conversely, during sober events like funerals, the obligation is less clear (see Sanhedrin 20a, תוס’ ד”ה נשים). Each situation must be assessed individually by a competent halachic authority to prevent any michshol, c”v. See also Sheilos U’Teshuvos Vayivarech Dovid (2:1), and Sheilos U’Teshuvos Az Nidberu (13:53).
In Sefer Kav Venaki (Vol. 1, §511), there is a discussion about a Talmud Chacham who was offered a rabbinic position in a Shul without a mechitzah. The Chazon Ish ruled that if the person believes that he can influence the congregation to install a proper mechitzah within a year, he may accept the position, and he should notify the congregation that the situation will soon change to avoid a potential chilul Hashem if people will think that he is acting as a Rav in a place without a mechitzah. If he does not think he will be able to convince them, he should decline. See also Masores Moshe, Vol. 3, p. 310.
Regarding our case, Sheilos U’Teshuvos Menachem Meshiv (§9) states that it is better to daven alone—even on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur—than in a Shul without a mechitzah. He bases this on the concern that he will see a dvar ervah, which is forbidden to daven in front of even when it is in a different reshus (such as if the women are on a balcony, as stated in Magen Avraham (§75) and Pri Megadim there.
This is the generally accepted ruling, as well as the psak of Maran Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv ztz”l, as recorded in Yivakshu M’pihu (Vol. 3, p. 398), that it is forbidden to daven in a Shul without a mechitzah. Additionally, the mechitzah must meet the minimum height requirements, as detailed in Igros Moshe (Orach Chaim 1:39–40). Otherwise, one should daven alone at home. Maran Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlit”a, ruled similarly.
It is clear from Igros Moshe (Orach Chaim 5:12) as well, that even b’dieved, one should not daven there.
However, in cases involving kibbud av or similar pressing circumstances, leniencies may apply. For example, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l, ruled (Ma’adanei Shlomo, p. 19) that someone visiting their parents and the mechitzah there was not halachically tall enough, one may daven there to honor his parents. This leniency is specific to such cases, and absent such a need, one should not be lenient.
In Conclusion: If a person finds himself in a Shul without a mechitzah, it is better for him to daven alone than join the minyan. In exceptional cases, such as kibbud av v’eim, there may be basis for leniency, and a Rav should be asked.
Is Birkas Hatorah Required Before Teaching Aleph-Beis to a Child?
Q: A father asked me whether he is required to recite Birkas HaTorah before teaching Aleph-Beis to his young child if he hasn’t yet recited the brachah. Similarly, others have inquired whether they must recite Birkas HaTorah if they will be teaching Aleph-Beis to ba’alei teshuvah. The root of the question is whether learning Aleph-Beis constitutes limud hatorah—akin to teaching Mikra, of which the father is obligated from the Torah to teach his child—or if it is merely preparation for Torah study, which would not necessitate the brachah. What is the halachah in practice?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 47:2) rules that Birkas HaTorah must be recited before learning Chumash, Mishnah, Gemara, or Midrash. Regarding reciting pesukim even for tefillah, the Shulchan Aruch (46:9) is stringent and requires Birkas HaTorah. This implies that anything included in the category of “limud hatorah” requires Birkas Hatorah.
This raises the question: Is learning Aleph-Beis—which is for the purpose of both Torah and tefillah—considered limud hatorah or merely preparatory for limud hatorah?
This question has practical ramifications beyond the question of Birkas Hatorah. For example, may one teach Aleph-Beis to a child while they are sitting Shiva or on Tisha B’Av? Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlit”a, ruled that since teaching Aleph-Beis does not bring joy as does regular limud hatorah, it is permitted to teach during Shiva or on Tisha B’Av. However, regarding Birkas HaTorah, which is not dependent on whether it brings “joy,” it is certainly considered Torah study for the child, and the father must recite the brachah before teaching.
In Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (4:17), R’ Moshe Shternbuch suggests that one would be obligated to recite Birkas HaTorah before teaching Aleph-Beis, based on the Gemara in Nedarim (37a). The Gemara there permits teaching young children pesukim for wages for its secondary benefits (as it is forbidden to charge money for teaching Torah itself), such as for watching the child, or teaching the trop or proper division of the text. If teaching Aleph-Beis were considered Torah study, why wouldn’t the Gemara include this as one of the reasons it is permitted to charge money? This would seem to suggest that teaching Aleph-Beis is considered Mikra itself, and therefore it is forbidden to charge for teaching it. However, this is not a proof, for perhaps the Gemara is referring to older children who are already familiar with the Aleph-Beis, and therefore the Gemara must say the reasons of the trop or for babysitting.
However, we may seemingly prove that it is considered limud hatorah from the Rema (Yoreh Deah 245:8), who rules that when a child reaches the age of three, they should be taught Aleph-Beis. The Gra explains that this is derived from the Midrash Tanchuma on Parashas Kedoshim, which compares the first three years of a child’s life to “orlah”: for the first three years their life, they are like orlah, without any mitzvos; only when they turn three, they begin mitzvos and Aleph-Beis. This would clearly indicate that teaching Aleph-Beis is in fact considered the mitzvah of Torah study of which the father is obligated to teach his son, for if it was merely preparatory to the mitzvah, they would be permitted to do so even before they turned three.
However, since most people do not view Aleph-Beis as limud hatorah and assume it to only be a preparation for limud hatorah, this may be comparable to tachanunim which contain pesukim, for which some Poskim are lenient, as cited at the end of Shulchan Aruch §46.
Accordingly, ideally, the father should recite Birkas HaTorah before teaching Aleph-Beis to his child and have in mind to fulfill the mitzvah of limud hatorah when doing so. However, b’shas hedchak, such as if a child asks him about a specific letter, he may rely on the lenient opinion that no brachah is required, and answer him without reciting Birkas HaTorah, since there is no explicit intent to fulfill the mitzvah of limud hatorah.
Is It Permissible to Communicate by Moving One’s Lips in a Situation Where Speaking Is Forbidden?
Q: A person was in the middle of Birkos Krias Shema, and his son approached him with an urgent question that needed an answer before he left. He later asked me whether it is permitted to respond by mouthing an answer, without emitting any air from his mouth. Does this constitute speech and is therefore prohibited, or perhaps it is like a gesture or wink, which is permissible for the sake of a mitzvah from the second paragraph onward, as explained in Mishnah Berurah (63:18)?
A: The Shulchan Aruch writes regarding Krias Shema (62:3): One must articulate the words audibly enough to hear them, but if one did not, they fulfill the obligation b’dieved as long as they moved their lips. A similar ruling appears in Siman 185:2 regarding Birkas Hamazon. The Mishnah Berurah in both places states that merely thinking the words in one’s heart does not suffice, as hirhur lav k’dibbur dami (thought is not equivalent to speech).
The question here concerns the definition of “moving one’s lips” mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch: Does merely moving the lips suffice, or is emitting air from the mouth necessary for it to be considered speech, and without this is it is merely hirhur? This question will be the deciding factor in our question: does lip movement alone constitute a hefsek, or perhaps since he is not emitting any air, it is not a hefsek.
Shevet HaKehati (6:71) discusses this issue and cites several Acharonim who rule that moving one’s lips is considered speech only when the syllables are properly formed using the five organs of articulation (hei motza’os hapeh), even if done so quietly that one cannot hear oneself. In such cases, the Shulchan Aruch rules that one fulfills their obligation b’dieved. However, if the syllables are not formed properly, and the lips merely move without the hei motza’os hapeh, it is not considered speech at all. Accordingly, it would also not constitute a hefsek in a situation where speaking is prohibited.
He also references the Leket Hakemach Hachadash (§62), who suggests that one does fulfill their obligation of krias shema—b’dieved—with lip movement alone, even without the hei motza’os hapeh. According to this view, such communication would indeed be considered a hefsek.
Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, shlit”a, as cited in Sheilos U’Teshuvos Vayishma Moshe, ruled that there is no distinction between whether one emits air or not. What matters is whether most people can understand what is being communicated through the lip movement. If most people would perceive it as speech, it is considered a hefsek, as it is not befitting to speak in this manner while standing and davening before Hashem. If, however, only expert lip-readers can discern such lip movements, it is not considered speech at all and is permissible.
However, Rav Yaakov Meir Stern, shlit”a, rules that if air is emitted from the mouth, it qualifies as speech for all matters—both with regard to fulfilling krias shema and for a hefsek. However, if no air is emitted, it does not qualify as speech—not for krias shema nor for a hefsek in situations where speaking is prohibited.
Accordingly, since this is a shas hadechak, the father would be permitted to mouth the answer to his son.
In Conclusion: It would seem that in practice, as long as no sound or air is emitted, it is not considered a hefsek.
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