Parshas Toldos 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers

Using a Sefer for a Photograph

Q: Someone asked me whether holding a Sefer in a photograph to show his love for learning constitutes a bizayon (disrespect) to the Sefer. Similarly, is it permissible to leave Sefarim on a table at home to give the impression of regular study, even if they are not being used? Does this constitute a bizayon to the Sefarim, or perhaps geneivas daas (deception)?

A: The fundamental question here is whether it is permissible to use sifrei kodesh for mundane purposes. In this case, the individual is not studying from the Sefer but is instead using it as a mere prop. As noted by the Acharonim, it is forbidden to demean a Sefer by using it for a mundane function. Leading Poskim have ruled that, ideally, such behavior constitutes both bizayon to the Sefer and a potential issue of geneivas daas and should therefore be avoided.

Indeed, there is a well-known story involving Maran HaGaon Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l. On Motzei Yom Kippur 5769, someone informed him that a photographer was waiting outside with a box containing the names of all the donors for a particular tzedakah organization. Rav Elyashiv agreed to let them take a photo. At that time, there were no Sefarim on the table, as he had just finished eating after the fast. Someone placed a Gemara on the table to avoid the appearance of an empty table. Immediately, Rav Elyashiv firmly objected, saying, “This is sheker! Remove the Gemara!”

However, since there are opinions that permit this practice and justify those who do so, I will quote a response I received on this matter from the great Gaon Rav Asher Weiss shlit”a, author of Minchas Asher and Av Beis Din of Darchei Torah of Yerushalayim. He wrote as follows:

It seems there is no prohibition in this case, neither regarding geneivas daas nor the use of holy books, and I will explain my reasoning:
It is clear to me that geneivas daas is only prohibited with regard to bein adam l’chaveiro (interpersonal interactions). It is a form of theft of property; just as it is forbidden to steal someone’s money, so too it is forbidden to deceive them and steal their knowledge. The essence of this prohibition lies in deceiving someone to gain something from them against their knowledge or will.

I have elaborated on this elsewhere and noted that Rambam discusses this halachah in two places: Hilchos Mechirah (18:1) and Hilchos Deos (2:6). From Rambam’s wording, it seems there are two aspects to geneivas daas: one as an extension of fraud in business transactions, and another related to personal integrity and emes, as Rambam writes in Hilchos Deos, “Rather, one should have only truthful speech, a proper spirit and a heart pure from all deceit and trickery.”

Yet, all the examples Rambam provides—even in Hilchos Deos—involve deceiving others for personal gain, similar to taking their money without their consent.

Therefore, in the case at hand, if someone’s intention is to deceive another for direct gain—e.g., to enhance their reputation, receive praise, secure a donation, or obtain assistance—this would indeed constitute geneivas daas. However, if the purpose is merely to maintain dignity—for instance, to avoid the embarrassment of leaving their table bare of Sefarim when hosting guests—there is no issue. This would be similar to wearing formal or rabbinic attire for guests, even if one does not normally wear them at home. There is no harm or deceit in such behavior.

There is also no concern regarding the use of sifrei kodesh. While it is clearly forbidden to use them for mundane purposes—such as to shield from sunlight or create a physical partition (as cited in Mishnah Berurah 154:31)—this prohibition applies when the Sefer itself is being utilized for a mundane purpose. There is some debate over whether one may use one Sefer to lift another Sefer—Mishnah Berurah in one place is lenient, while Taz is stringent—but nevertheless, that applies only when one is using the actual Sefer. Simply placing Sefarim on a table, as one would when learning, does not constitute a bizayon hasefer.

This is similar to receiving guests in a room with Sefarim rather than the dining room; this is merely a matter of personal dignity and does dishonor the Sefarim. Similarly, someone who wishes to be photographed with a bookshelf of Sefarim in the background, this would not constitute a bizayon to the Sefarim.

This is because Sefarim are not considered issurei hanaah (prohibited from deriving benefit), but rather it is prohibited to use them for mundane purposes. Thus, there is no prohibition with placing them on a table to receive guests or to take a photograph with them on the table.

The following story illustrates this point. A guest once visited the home of HaGaon R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ztz”l, and upon leaving, asked to photograph him. Rav Shlomo Zalman kindly agreed. The guest then boldly asked if Rav Shlomo Zalman could open a Gemara for the picture, and Rav Shlomo Zalman, in his great humility, complied.

However, it is possible that after the guest left, Rav Shlomo Zalman learned from the Sefer, thus avoiding any semblance of inappropriate use of the Sefer, similar to the halachah of kapandaria (taking a shortcut through a Beis Haknesses). If one enters a Beis Haknesses for personal needs or to use as a shortcut, they should recite or learn a verse to avoid the appearance of using the Beis Haknesses for personal purposes (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 151:1). Similarly, in this case, it would certainly be permissible.

A Convert Who Converts After Attending a Wedding: Can He Be Considered Panim Chadashos?

Q: At a Sheva Berachos in a yeshiva, some students arrived accompanied by a non-Jew who was in the process of converting. Two days later, the individual completed his geirus. The question arose: Can he now be considered panim chadashos for the purpose of reciting the Sheva Berachos? On one hand, he was present at the wedding and may have contributed to Simchas Chasan; on the other, perhaps as a non-Jew, his presence did not count in this regard, allowing him to now qualify as panim chadashos after his conversion.

A: The fundamental question here is, do we say that since he was not Jewish at the time of the wedding, it is as though he did not participate in the wedding. To clarify this halachic issue, we must first address the underlying rationale for requiring panim chadashos.

The Gemara in Kesubos (7b-8a) discusses the obligation of panim chadashos to recite the Sheva Berachos. The Rishonim debate what this refers to:

• According to the Rambam (and the first opinion cited in Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 62:7), panim chadashos refers to someone who has not yet heard the brachos under the Chuppah.
• The Rosh and other Rishonim hold that it refers to someone who has not yet participated in the seudah, even if they heard the brachos under the Chuppah.

Accordingly, one could argue that since the convert was a non-Jew at the time of the Chuppah, this would not apply to him.

Indeed, this question was posed to Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l, who ruled that the convert can be considered panim chadashos. He quoted the Gemara in Kiddushin (62b), which states: “Initially, she was like a beast, but now [after she is freed], she is an independent mind.” In other words, her status has fundamentally changed, and she is now a new person halachically.

A similar story involved a man who, r”l, lived together with a non-Jewish woman. He was then chozer b’teshuvah and left her, and even vowed never to return to her. Years later, after studying diligently in yeshiva for twelve years, he was suggested a shidduch with a convert. Upon meeting her, he realized she was the same woman he had vowed to avoid! Rav Chaim ruled that since her status had entirely changed—“Initially, she was like an animal; now she is a person”—she is considered a different individual, and the man was permitted to marry her.

Thus, in the case of the convert attending the Sheva Berachos, his prior presence as a non-Jew is irrelevant, and he is halachically considered panim chadashos.

If a Person Was Mekadesh a Woman with a Diamond Ring — Does He Need to Repeat the Kiddushin?

Q: The accepted minhag is to be mekadesh (betroth) a woman with a plain ring, without any stones, so that the kallah knows precisely the value of the ring and the item with which she is being mekudeshes, avoiding any possible misunderstanding about its worth. However, an incident occurred where a couple used a ring with diamonds. Is it necessary to repeat the Kiddushin?

A: The Rema (Even HaEzer, 31:2) writes that one should not be mekadesh a woman with a diamond ring, based on the opinions of Rabbeinu Tam and the Ran. The reasoning is that even if he was mekadesh her without specifying—and he did not say, “Be mekadesh yourself with this ring worth, which is worth fifty zuz”—there is still concern that the kallah might mistakenly assume the diamond is worth much more than its actual value. Therefore, we are concerned that she might have only agreed to be mekudeshes under this mistaken impression, and without it, she might not have agreed at all. This would render the Kiddushin invalid due to kiddushei taus (mistaken, or misled, Kiddushin). Therefore, it is considered a safek kiddushin (doubt whether kiddushin took place) that requires repeating the Kiddushin. See further in Otzar HaPoskim (31:14) who cites many Acharonim on this topic.

However, the Pischei Teshuvah (ibid. 4) quotes R’ Yaakov of Lisa (author of Nesivos HaMishpat and Chavas Daas), who writes that in modern times, since kallahs have their faces covered and cannot see the ring, the concern of overestimating the ring’s value does not apply, and thus the Kiddushin is valid. Similarly, other Acharonim have written in this vein.

If the chosson informs the kallah and the Rav beforehand that he intends to be mekadesh her with a diamond ring, lechatchilah, this should be prevented. However, bidieved, the Kiddushin is valid, especially today when the Mesader Kiddushin asks the witnesses if the ring is worth at least a perutah and the kallah hears and consents. And if he states that she should be mekadesh herself with a perutah, the Kiddushin is certainly valid.

We may suggest yet another reason to validate the Kiddushin in such a case, based on a discussion in the Poskim regarding a case where a chosson purchased a ring under the assumption that it was pure silver, only to later discover it was merely silver-plated. Despite this error, leading Poskim have ruled that there is no need to repeat the Kiddushin, even though the chosson might have voided the purchase had he known beforehand. This is because we assume the chosson does not want the marriage invalidated post-facto, since this would retroactively render his intimacy into illicit relations (oseh be’ilaso be’ilas z’nus). See Kovetz Beis Dovid (Choshen Mishpat, p. 250), where Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein cites Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l on this question.

Furthermore, even if the chosson intends to return the ring to the seller, some Poskim argue that there is no need to repeat the Kiddushin. This is because the seller is required, according to Choshen Mishpat, to refund the payment for a pure silver ring, and the chosson is essentially holding the ring as a mashkon (collateral). Accordingly, when he gives the kallah this mashkon, he is being mekadesh her with the collateral that he has on others, which is a valid form of Kiddushin. Additionally, there is no concern about the kallah being misled, as the witnesses confirm the ring’s value of at least a perutah in her presence, which demonstrates her intent to accept the Kiddushin even if the ring is only worth a perutah.

For further discussion, see Teshuvos Keneh Bosem (1:120) and Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (4:292).