Parshas Re’eh 5784 – Intriguing Questions & Answers

A Person Pledged to Give Maaser from His Raffle Winnings, but Then Learned the Organization Had Already Deducted Maaser from the Prize Money

Q: A case arose involving a man who bought a raffle ticket from a major charity organization. The grand prize was $100,000. The buyer pledged that if he won, he would give a maaser (tenth) of the prize money to the Torah institutions where he studies in Kollel. B’Siyata D’Shmaya, his ticket was drawn. However, when he went to collect his winnings, he discovered that one of the raffle’s conditions was that the charity organization running it would take a maaser of the prize money for themselves, leaving him with only $90,000.

Now he is uncertain: Is he obligated to take maaser again from the remaining sum and give $9,000 to the Kollel where he studies? Or was his pledge made in error, as he did not intend to give a tenth twice?

A: To properly address this question, we must first determine whether the sum deducted by the charity organization as maaser from the prize is halachically correct. For perhaps this would be considered as though the maaser was taken without the explicit consent of the recipient, and thus does not qualify as maaser but rather as a form of compulsory donation, thus requiring the winner to separate maaser anew from the entire prize amount. Additionally, we must consider whether the winner can claim that his pledge was made in error; he assumed he would receive $100,000 from which he would separate maaser, leaving him with $90,000. Had he known he would only receive $90,000 initially, he may not have made any pledge at all.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 258:12) states that if one promises to give tzedakah to his fellow, and the recipient is poor, it is considered like a neder to charity and thus he is prohibited from retracting. Accordingly, we must determine whether it is permissible to alter or be relieved of the obligation to give the second maaser, given that it was a neder.

In practice, it would appear that the sum deducted by the charity organization from the prize does indeed qualify as maaser, as this practice is common among many charity organizations. The organization is permitted to do this, and consequently, the winner is not required to separate maaser again from the prize amount, since it emerges that his pledge was made in error—he assumed he had the discretion to allocate the maaser as he saw fit and was unaware of his obligation to give it to this specific organization. Certainly, he did not intend to give more than the standard amount. Several contemporary Poskim concur with this view (see Responsa VaYishma Moshe 6:188).

One could argue that, in any case, we cannot obligate him to give a second time because his original commitment was only to give to a particular institution, and he could fulfill his obligation by giving to a different one. After all, it is permissible in such circumstances to transfer funds from one charity to another. See R’ Akiva Eiger to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 258:12), who cites the Ketzos HaChoshen that it is not considered a vow, even if intended for a poor person, in such a case, and he may give it to someone else. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate for him to make a nice donation to the institutions he originally intended to support, even though he is not obligated to give them the maaser from the prize.

However, R’ Yitzchak Zilberstein maintains that he must fulfill the second pledge to charity. He explains that the rationale behind the person making this pledge before the raffle was to invoke the zechus of the pledge and the zechus of the Torah study and chessed performed in these institutions, thereby increasing his chances of winning. Is it conceivable that now that he has won, he should not fulfill his promise?! And although he did not win the full $100,000 but only $90,000, this does not absolve him of his obligation. Therefore, according to R’ Zilberstein’s ruling, the winner cannot exempt himself from giving maaser from the amount he receives to the Torah institutions he promised. R’ Zilberstein references the words of Rambam (Hilchos Matnas Aniyim 10:2): “A person will never become impoverished from giving charity, nor will any harm or loss be caused through charity…” Assuredly, he will not incur any loss by fulfilling his pledge as stated.

Nonetheless, one who finds it difficult to give the full maaser twice has a basis to rely on the argument that the pledge was made in error. However, it is still advisable that he add some additional charity to the extent possible.

A Person Made the Brachah on Challah on Friday Night and His Wife Exclaimed, “Oh No! I May Have Forgotten to Separate Challah from the Dough!”

Q: A question arose where a man made the Hamotzi blessing over the challahs on Friday night. Immediately after he put a piece in his mouth, his wife told him that she was unsure if she had separated challah from the dough. He was uncertain whether, due to this doubt, he could swallow the piece, since on Shabbos it is forbidden to separate challah due to the concern of fixing (tikkun) on Shabbos. Or do we say that it is forbidden to taste from even safek tevel, food which we are uncertain whether they have been properly tithed, and he must spit out the piece and say, “Baruch Shem Kevod Malchuso…”

A: It appears that in this case, it is preferable to say, “Baruch Shem.” However, one who relies on swallowing the piece has a basis for doing so, as we will explain b’ezras Hashem. Although the obligation to separate challah nowadays, even in Eretz Yisroel, is only d’rabanan, as explained in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 322:2), nevertheless, the Poskim explain that we are stringent in cases of doubt regarding challah in Eretz Yisroel, treating it like safek m’doraisa. This is inferred from the words of the Mishneh LaMelech (Hilchos Terumah 7:17), as elaborated in Responsa Minchas Yitzchak (8:109). Therefore, in this case, we lean towards stringency. See also Da’as Torah (322:3) and Shach (Yoreh De’ah 330:3).

However, there is room to be lenient and rely on eating the challah, based on Responsa Levushei Mordechai (Yoreh De’ah §213). He suggests that it should be permitted in our case, assuming that the wife usually separates challah and is accustomed to doing so, based on the reasoning that we assume she acted according to her habit (sirkei nakit v’asi), as it is part of her routine. This is similar to what the Taz writes in Yoreh De’ah (69:24) regarding a doubt about whether meat was salted, where we say it is her habit. The same applies here—we assume she separated challah as usual.

Nevertheless, there is room to distinguish between these cases. In our case, it is ischazek issura, an established prohibition, as the dough is certainly obligated in challah separation. This is unlike the case of unsalted meat, which the Taz does not consider to be ischazek issura, since the piece itself is permissible and only the blood inside is forbidden. Therefore, if the wife is unsure whether she separated challah from her dough, even if she is accustomed to doing so, we cannot permit it based on the assumption of habit, since it conflicts with the chezkas tevel (the presumption that it is untithed). Even in cases of doubt regarding challah, we are stringent as if it were a safek d’oraisa, as explained. Thus, it seems that one should spit it out, even though he made a brachah on it, and he need not worry about making a blessing in vain. This is what I heard from several leading Poskim. For even if he eats from it, he doesn’t avoid a blessing in vain according to Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 196:1), which states that it is forbidden to make a blessing on something prohibited.

Likewise, Responsa Levushei Mordechai (Yoreh De’ah 2:167) rules that if one made a blessing on dairy foods and then remembered that he was still within six hours of eating meat, he should not taste it but rather should say Baruch Shem.

See also Responsa Shevet HaLevi (1:205), who rules that if one made a brachah on food and before tasting it became concerned about its kosher status, he is not obligated to put himself in a position of possible prohibition. He should say Baruch Shem and not worry about a blessing in vain, since eating it does not absolve him of this either. This is certainly true if it becomes clear that it is actually prohibited, even if only d’rabanan. Responsa Har Tzvi (1:99) adds that since at the time of his brachah, it was said with good intention, as an expression of praise and gratitude, and only now that he is unaware that it may be problematic is he abstaining from eating, it is not considered a brachah in vain.

From all this, it appears that in our case, one should spit it out and say Baruch Shem. However, since there are Poskim who rely on the Taz in such a case, one who is lenient and eats the challah has a basis for his position. Nevertheless, ideally, one should certainly be stringent and say, Baruch Shem.

Payment for a Repairman Who Didn’t Fix an Electrical Appliance, but Rather It Worked on Its Own

Q: I brought an electric hot water urn to a repairman to fix. He tried extensively but couldn’t repair it. He returned the appliance, saying he had tried everything but failed, and therefore didn’t request payment. A day later, I tried to operate the urn myself, and it started working. I am uncertain whether I am obligated to pay him for the repair he might have done since it is now working, or perhaps I am exempt from payment because he may not have actually fixed it, and maybe it just repaired itself?

A: It appears that in this case, the owner is exempt from paying the repairman. This is because it is possible that the appliance resumed working not due to the repairman’s efforts, but on its own, as sometimes happens. Although it is possible that it started working again due to the repairman’s attempt to fix it without his knowledge, for example, by moving a wire or something similar, this is only a safek. Furthermore, when the repairman returned the appliance without charging, he already forfeited the payment due to him for his effort and work.

Additionally, it seems he is exempt based on the comparison to a case where someone knows he owes his friend money, but the friend tells him he doesn’t owe anything. The Shulchan Aruch rules that he is exempt because this constitutes forgiveness (Choshen Mishpat 75:11). See also the Shach there (33) in the name of the Tur, that even if his forgiveness was in error, nevertheless, since he told him “I owe you,” he should have paid attention and been more careful. Since he did not do so and instead said “Surely you don’t owe me,” it is considered as though he forgave him wholeheartedly. Similarly, in our case, when the repairman returned the item to the owner saying it couldn’t be fixed, since he didn’t check thoroughly and wasn’t precise, he surely forgave wholeheartedly.

See further discussion in Responsa Shevet HaKehati (6:446).

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