Parshas Emor 5784: Intriguing Questions and Answers

 Could a Rav who regularly counts Sefiras Haomer for his shul every night continue to do so despite having inadvertently missed a day?

Q: The Rav of a certain shul customarily counts Sefiras Haomer for his congregants every evening. While away for a few days, however, he mistakenly let a night and the entire next day go by without counting. He’s aware, of course, that he may not continue counting with a berachah, but how can he now return to his community and be suddenly unable to recite the blessing before everyone in shul and lead them in counting each evening, as he’s done for decades? Is there any way that he, as a Rav, could be spared the embarrassment of having forgotten to count and be allowed to publicly recite the berachah nonetheless?

A: The Rishonim argue regarding the nature of the Torah commandment to count Sefiras Haomer. Is the mitzvah to count forty-nine consecutive days, or to simply count each day, with every separate twenty-four-hour period its own distinct mitzvah? According to those maintaining that each day encompasses a separate mitzvah, one could continue counting with a berachah despite having missed a full day. The accepted halachah, however, follows those who hold that the mitzvah is to count forty-nine consecutive days, the consequence of which is the stringency of reciting a berachah only while maintaining the consistency of the full count, one day following the next, with no gap. See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 489:8. Regarding our case of the Rav, Pri Chadash (489) writes that one cannot recite a berachah over the sefirah for others if he himself has missed a full day and, as such, may not recite a berachah for himself. This was the opinion of Harav Shlomo Elyashiv, zt”l. However, Harav Moshe Feinstein and Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Shevet HaLevi 3:96) both maintained that based upon those Rishonim who regard each day as a separate mitzvah unto itself, the Rav could be spared embarrassment and continue reciting the berachah for his shul.

Is the conversion of a convert who won’t cover her hair a valid geirus?

Q: A gentile woman went through the long process of conversion and was finally ready to accept upon herself ol mitzvos (the yoke of the mitzvos) with one exception. She just couldn’t imagine being comfortable with covering her hair once married. Would geirus under such circumstances remain valid?

A: The Gemara (Berachos 30) states that a gentile who accepts upon himself all the Torah’s mitzvos except one is not a valid convert. This is the opinion of both the Rishonim and the Acharonim. There is a discussion in the Poskim as to whether or not a gentile who accepts upon himself all the Torah’s mitzvos with the exception of mitzvos d’rabbanan can be regarded as a valid convert. See Responsa Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:72. A woman covers her hair in accord with a Torah law, as can be seen in Kesubos 72 and in Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha’ezer 21 and 115. According to this, it seems that the conversion in our case would be unacceptable. Yet perhaps we could be lenient and accept the conversion under certain circumstances. If she is genuinely prepared to accept Hashem and His mitzvos in full faith, it is worth considering the possibility that after her conversion, in due time, she’ll cultivate a deeper understanding of the mitzvos, perceive the true beauty of the Jewish woman’s modesty, and find herself ready and even anxious to cover her hair upon marrying. The great Gaon Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski from Vilna wrote in his Responsa Achiezer (3:21) that the above-mentioned Gemara (Berachos 30) invalidating the conversion of a gentile who accepts all the Torah’s mitzvos except one is specifically with regard to someone who knows full well that the Torah forbids a certain act yet who nonetheless decides, lechatchilah, that he will perform it, out of the warped belief that, for him, the act is permitted. However, a gentile who essentially accepts all of Hashem’s Torah yet who feels, for whatever reason, that a certain mitzvah will be difficult for him to uphold is in a different category and is not necessarily subject to the Gemara’s dismissal. Therefore, a gentile who converts while admitting that he finds a certain prohibition difficult to observe despite his awareness and compliance that it is forbidden is accepted as a valid convert. Some Poskim indeed maintain this position. I discussed this question with my rebbe Harav Avigdor Nevenzahl, shlit”a, and with other Gedolim as well, and the halachic conclusion is that although the above-mentioned permissibility from Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski is not agreed upon by all or most leading Poskim, we are lenient, bedieved, to accept the woman’s conversion despite her admitted difficulty with covering her hair. Of course, it is incumbent upon every beis din and Rav to teach her about the importance of a married woman’s hair being covered and to encourage her to overcome her reluctance in preparation for marriage. Additionally, the Poskim do take into consideration the unfortunate fact that, today, some women do not cover their hair, despite their otherwise faithful observance of Shabbos, kashrus, and taharas mishpachah. It is therefore very understandable that amidst a social climate in which some observant Jews themselves find covering their hair challenging, a potential convert might view the mitzvah more as an additional stringency relative to the fundamental obligations of Shabbos, kashrus, and the like. Though this certainly does not validate, chalilah, the actions of these Jewish women, beis din can be lenient, bedieved, and consider this woman’s conversion valid. Hopefully, she will mature in her Yiddishkeit and understand that, upon marrying, covering her hair is as essential as keeping Shabbos and kashrus. I will point out that Harav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, was consulted on many occasions regarding this question of female converts and their reluctance to cover their hair upon marriage. He clearly ruled that when the conversion is performed with the erroneous stipulation that the woman needn’t cover her hair, the conversion is invalid. And he would add that rabbanim involved with potential converts must not think that they can spare gentile women the pressure of having to cover their hair once married. On the contrary, they must clearly teach them what their obligation will be as married Jewish women and unreservedly express their rejection of any observant woman’s halachically unsanctioned decision to not cover her hair!

May one threaten to sue his fellow Jew in civil court?

Q: Someone who works at a beis din recently told me that it’s common practice for one litigant to threaten to sue the other in civil court as a means of ensuring that he’ll obey his summons to beis din. Though actually going beyond the parameters of beis din to sue a fellow Jew in the secular or gentile legal system is certainly forbidden, is it permitted to even threaten such a course of action?

A: The Torah tells us in Parshas Mishpatim “וְאֵלֶּה הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר תָּשִׂים לִפְנֵיהֶם” (Shemos 21:1), and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 26:1), as well as Rashi on the pasuk, write that Chazal derive from the word “לִפְנֵיהֶם” the obligation to present litigation between Jews specifically “before them,” i.e., the judges of beis din, and not before the gentile courts – even when you know the gentile court will render the same decision as beis din. The reason for this prohibition is based on the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu instituted the batei din and judges of Israel in accord with Hashem’s will, and by seeking justice in the gentile legal system, one is suggesting that our batei din are not aligned with Hashem’s emes and ratzon. See Siman 26:4. The basic permissibility to avail oneself of the gentile civil courts emerges when beis din permits one to go. In such a scenario, the gentile court is then acting as “messengers” of beis din. See Responsa Chasam Sofer Choshen Mishpat Siman 3. There are other instances when we permit one to go to the gentile courts, but they’re beyond the scope of our discussion. I discussed our question with Harav Avigdor Nevenzahl, shlit”a, and he said that there is no issur in threatening another Jew with legal action in the gentile courts if the reason for doing so is to force him to come to beis din. This is also reflected in the permissibility given by the Kesef Kadoshim in his commentary to Choshen Mishpat 26. He writes that one may seek civil legal action against a Jew who does not keep the Torah and would not obey beis din’s ruling, much less bother to appear before the dayanim.

Harav Yaakov Skoczylas Shlit”a, the Rosh Kollel of Kollel Lihoraah Yerushalayim is the author of the “Ohel Yaakov” series on numerous halachic topics.

Harav Skoczylas is highly regarded as a reputable Posek and Moreh Tzedek in Yerushalayim, and receives many halachic inquiries from around the globe seeking his guidance and clarification.

Feel free to reach out to the Bais Horaah with any halacha inquiries by emailing halacha@kollellihoraah.org.

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