True Freedom on Pesach: Insights from the Haggadah

Rabbi Yaakov Aron Skoczylas   -  

What Does It Mean to Be Truly Free?

“We begin the Haggadah on Seder night with the words “הא לחמא עניא … לשנה הבאה בני חורין”. What does it mean to be bnei chorin, free people? The great Gaon and Posek Hador Maran Harav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, zt”l, would tell his guests at the beginning of the Seder that we find three types of freedom in the world. There is political freedom, in which an entire nation gains independence from tyrannical leadership. There is physical freedom that an individual experiences when, finally, the heavy yoke of hard labor is removed from him. And there is freedom of the soul, when people experience the spiritual independence to throw off the moral and psychological shackles of unjust, self-serving fanaticism so that they might worship G-d as they see fit.

Our three chagim of Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos mirror these varying levels of freedom. Pesach marks the birth of Am Yisroel, our emergence as an independent nation, free of the dictatorial and immoral tyranny of Pharaoh and Mitzrayim. Sukkos is called Chag Ha’asif, the “festival of ingathering,” when all the grain and produce for the entire year is harvested and gathered in and the hard labor of cultivating and reaping one’s crops has ceased. As such, one feels a certain physical freedom with this yoke of hard labor now lifted. And Shavuos, the time of the giving of the Torah at Har Sinai, marks our spiritual freedom, when we wholeheartedly and unreservedly embraced the obligation to observe the Torah’s 613 mitzvos and declared: “נַעֲשֶׁה וְנִשְׁמָע” (Shemos 24:7).

Our sense of spiritual freedom at Har Sinai was so complete that we stated “נַעֲשֶׁה” – we will do – before “נִשְׁמָע” – we will apprehend, expressing our absolute readiness to obligate ourselves in performing Hashem’s mitzvos regardless of whether or not we understand them. This is how willing we were to carry the yoke of Torah.

Now, a secular Jew who hasn’t yet tasted the joy of Torah and mitzvos might find this confusing. “This you call freedom?” he would ask. “Are you crazy? You don’t run toward a yoke. You run away from it and try to escape it! That’s freedom!” And if he could see all that we do in preparing for and keeping the chag of Pesach, he would think us all the more insane.

However, what distinguishes a free person from a slave is not necessarily the labor, but for whom one labors – not the yoke, but for whom one carries the yoke. The slave works for his master. Every drop of benefit from his hard labor goes to his master. The slave himself receives nothing, and after a lifetime of bearing his master’s yoke, he will have gained nothing. Not so the ben Torah! All of his hard work is, ultimately, for himself. Everything he does in the service of Hashem is for his own benefit. Hashem, actually, needs and wants no profit whatsoever. And at the end of a lifetime of bearing his Master’s yoke, he will have gained everything, and for all eternity.

A person who has not tasted the true pleasure of the Torah nor felt the joy of observing the mitzvos sees only labor and yoke and assumes that all masters are alike. He sees only the burden, not the inner peace, the refinement, the excitement, and the sense of great accomplishment implied in Chazal’s words: “אין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק בתורה” (Tanna D’bei Eliyahu Zuta 17).

May we all continue to serve Hashem with simcha and enjoy every moment of being true bnei chorin, learning His Torah, performing more and more mitzvos, and continuously fighting our inclination that strives to enslave us to our desires. May we continue to know the joy of partnering with Torah learning and avail ourselves of this tremendous zechus that is an absolute source of berachah, shefa, and true freedom!”


The True Power of an Individual!

“Regarding the plague of frogs, the Torah states: “וַיֵּט אַהֲרֹן אֶת יָדוֹ עַל מֵּי מִצְרָיִם וַתַּעַל הַצְּפַרְדֵּעַ וַתְּכַס אֶת אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם” (Shemos 8:2), with the word “הַצְּפַרְדֵּעַ” oddly couched in the singular to describe the countless frogs that swarmed Egypt.

Quoting the Gemara in Sanhedrin (67b), Rashi explains that one frog emerged from the water, and as the Mitzrim struck it, it showered forth many swarms of frogs. Alternatively, he notes that a clustering of frogs is generally referred to in the singular. Yet why would the pasuk, in any event, initially describe the plague of frogs as consisting of a single frog?

Rabbi Moshe Sternbach, shlit”a, explains that HaKadosh Baruch Hu brought forth one enormous frog to show Pharaoh that he could not escape responsibility for enslaving the Jewish people. He couldn’t claim that while he merely pushed an agenda as an individual ruler, it was the Egyptian people who actually carried out the enslavement, maintaining the national atmosphere of oppression while he just set the ball in motion. To this, Hashem said no. You will be held accountable, for such can be the power of an individual.

Though one man, Pharaoh brilliantly and cunningly swayed an entire nation of Mitzrim to enslave and torment the Bnei Yisrael, much like Hitler, yimach shemo, crafted a national agenda of antisemitism and genocide as a lone, charismatic political entity.

The extreme negative now clarifies the extreme positive, for we see from here the awesome potential of the individual to do good, to uplift masses of people, to change an entire world for the better. The great men of Am Yisrael who emerged from the ashes of the Shoah rebuilt Torah and Chassidic Dynasties of unimaginable scales. Each was nothing more than an individual with an irrepressible sense of hope and purpose. And they teach each and every one of us, the many individuals of Klal Yisrael, that we possess the tremendous strength to harness the power of holiness, achieve great heights, influence others, and build worlds upon worlds of goodness.”

 


Questions and Answers

May one send his gentile aid to burn his chametz for him?

Q: Does my elderly father fulfill the mitzvah of “tashbitzu” when he sends his non-Jewish caregiver out to burn his chametz? For that matter, does a man who sends his young son out to burn his chametz fulfill the mitzvah?

A: We must first note that there is a dispute between the Magan Avraham and Rabbi Akiva Eiger regarding the permissibility of sending a gentile to burn one’s chametz on Erev Pesach. Rav Akiva Eiger is stringent, claiming that no shlichus whatsoever can exist between a Jew and a non-Jew. The Magan Avraham, however, is lenient and permits using a gentile to fulfill the mitzvah of “tashbitzu”; and we shall explore the origins of his position. Perhaps the Magen Avraham maintains that when the Gemara in Bava Metzia (71a) decides that there can be no shlichus via a gentile, it is with regard to scenarios involving a new “chala’os,” or manifestation, such as in cases of kiddushin (effecting the new manifestation of marriage), of gittin (effecting the new manifestation of divorce), or of kinyan (effecting the new manifestation of ownership). However, scenarios entailing a mere ma’aseh, or action, and that do not entail any new chala’os would not fall within the prohibition of a gentile serving as a Jew’s shliach. The Magen Avraham therefore writes (Nesivos 182) that regarding a simple ma’aseh, there can be a shlichus with a gentile or a minor. Another reason for leniency in allowing a gentile to burn one’s chametz is grounded in the nature of the mitzvah of “tashbitzu” as being the removal of leaven from the house. Nothing positive is being achieved or effected, only the eradication of something. The goal is to simply get it out of the house and destroy it. Therefore, a gentile or minor could certainly serve as one’s shliach in accomplishing this goal. In conclusion, most Acharonim, including the Mishnah Berurah, are lenient and permit one to send a gentile or minor out to burn one’s chametz. I believe this is based on the above-mentioned logic that the halachic impossibility of shlichus between a Jew and a gentile is with regard to scenarios involving a new chala’os. Yet in scenarios of ma’aseh alone, there can be shlichus between a Jew and a gentile (or a minor). Of course, it would be prudent for one who sends a gentile or minor out to burn his chametz to verify with another Jewish adult that his shliach did indeed successfully accomplish the mission.

 

May one eat schnitzel Erev Pesach that was fried with matzah meal?

Q: I know that you’re not allowed to eat matzah on Erev Pesach, but would that apply to something like chicken schnitzel fried with matzah meal?

A: Let’s first clarify the prohibition of eating matzah on Erev Pesach. The Mishnah in Pesachim (99b) states that one may not eat matzah on Erev Pesach close to the time of Mincha. Tosafos maintains, however, that this cannot be referring to matzah, since the Yerushalmi in Pesachim (10:1) prohibits eating it on Erev Pesach altogether, regardless of the time of day.
Some reasons brought down as to why matzah may not be eaten on Erev Pesach are as follows. We must make a clear distinction between the matzah we eat all year round and the matzah we will be eating in the capacity of fulfilling a mitzvah on Pesach night (see Haseder Ha’aruch 1:7, page 75). Additionally, some Rishonim highlight the importance of not spoiling one’s appetite before Seder night. Further still, some reason that since the Korban Pesach was not eaten until Pesach night, so too should one refrain from eating matzah until Seder night. As for when the prohibition starts, some maintain one should stop eating matzah from the time that chametz is forbidden on Erev Pesach, namely, from the sixth hour of the day. Some people have the practice to stop eating matzah from Rosh Chodesh Nissan. The widespread custom, however, is to refrain from the early morning of Erev Pesach. Now, the question at hand is whether or not the matzah meal in which schnitzel is fried has the same status as matzah itself. This was discussed amongst some of the contemporary Poskim, and the consensus was that since the ground, fried matzah clinging to the chicken retains the taste (and perhaps even “form” of matzah), it is like matzah itself and should not be eaten on Erev Pesach.
Some background details to this decision:
The Mishnah Berurah (471) writes that matzah meal cooked in a pot to produce matzah balls is permitted on Erev Pesach. Yet frying, as opposed to cooking, is a matter of halachic dispute amongst the Achronim within the realm of hilchos berachos (as noted by the Mishnah Berurah early on in 168). The nature of the rabbinic concern is as follows: A “cooked dish” (such as matzah balls) in no way resembles bread and, as such, always requires a “borei minei mezonos,” regardless how much one consumes. A fried wheat product, however, does somewhat resemble bread and, as such, may require a “hamotzei lechem min ha’aretz” if one eats a significant amount. It is therefore customary to regard such fried wheat products as pastries and, as a precautionary measure, eat them within a bread meal to avoid halachic uncertainties.
It would seem, therefore, that fried matzah meal should be considered not as a cooked dish (i.e., matzah balls) but, rather, as a baked item (i.e., pastry). As such, it should not be eaten on Erev Pesach. As mentioned, therefore, with regard to the chicken schnitzel fried with a matzah meal coating, one should be stringent and not eat it on Erev Pesach.

 

Must a father whose firstborn son is mentally disabled fast during the taanis bechorim on Erev Pesach?

Q: The Rama (470) writes that a father fasts on Erev Pesach for his firstborn son until the boy reaches the age of bar mitzvah. If this child, however, is mentally disabled, need the father fast for him at all? And if yes, does the father always have to fast for his son, since the boy will always mentally remain a boy due to his disability?

A: The great Gaon Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky, zt”l, maintained that the father should fast for his mentally disabled son every year, even after the boy has reached the age of bar mitzvah. This is because the taanis bechorim is undertaken to save the firstborn’s life and spare him the fate of Egypt’s sons in the plague of the firstborn. Now, in terms of life saving, there’s naturally no difference between a mentally disabled son and one who is fully functional. Hence, the father must fast. As in any case, however, the father can always exempt himself from fasting by participating in the conclusion of a mashecta (siyum).

Yet some Poskim maintain that, on the contrary, the father needn’t fast for a mentally disabled firstborn son, even before he’s reached the age of bar mitzvah. This is because they view the father’s obligation to fast as being rooted in his duty of chinuch, of preparing the child for the day when he himself will assume responsibility for the taanis bechorim. And having seen his father fast over the years, the boy will shoulder this obligation all the more readily. A mentally disabled son, however, is not expected to mature and reach that stage of responsibility, for this mitzvah or for any other. Hence, the father does not need to fast.

In conclusion, one should act according to the opinion that the father always fasts for his mentally disabled son, even after the boy reaches the age of bar mitzvah; and should he find this physically burdensome, he may simply participate in a siyum of a masechta in the morning of Erev Pesach. If he fears that attending a siyum will be impossible, he can certainly rely on those Poskim who maintain that he is always exempt.

May one who received ma’os chitim and purchased food for Pesach use leftover funds for other needs?

Q: I was given several hundred dollars for Pesach expenses, and the very generous donor said, “Here. This is for kimcha d’pischa.” We then very happily went food shopping. We do, however, have leftover money. Can we use it to cover some of our other needs? Or should we regard it as earmarked for Pesach and save it for next year?

A: Our primary concern in these matters is the intention of the giver or givers. When a person, as in this case, hands someone a donation and specifies that the money is for kimcha d’pischa or ma’os chitim, is his intention to exclude any other needs besides food? Or when there’s a kimcha d’pischa appeal in shul before Pesach, are the contributors intending that the money be used by recipients for, literally, “flour for Pesach” in the sense of food expenses? Or are they intending that the money can be used to purchase food and any other needed items?

Rabbi Yitzchak Zilberstein maintains that the recipient should use the leftover money immediately for whatever he needs and that when the giver said, “This is for kimcha d’pischa,” it was with the understanding that food is just one of the recipient’s many wanting necessities and that leftover money should certainly go toward meeting those needs rather than be put away for next year.

Now, I discussed this issue with Maran Harav Avigdor Nevenzahl, shlit”a, regarding the case of a ma’os chitim appeal made in shul, and he expressed that it truly depends upon the intentions of the donors. If, for instance, the congregants have mentioned in past years a concern that their donations go expressly to food for Pesach, then the recipients would have to be diligent and limit the money’s use to purchasing food. On the other hand, if congregants have expressed an openness to helping the community’s needy get whatever they might need for the holiday, then the recipients would have that freedom to use the money for food and, should there be any leftover, for other things they lack.

As this is obviously a difficult area in which to achieve certainty, Rav Nevenzahl suggested finding some way of clarifying the donors’ intentions when they give.

Do pages, or pieces of pages, from a siddur that went through the washing machine require genizah?

Q: In my rush to clean everything during the days before Pesach, I put my son’s knapsack in the washing machine without checking every compartment. Unfortunately, his siddur went through a very hot, very intensive cycle and left several pages and tiny pieces of pages stuck to the knapsack and other items in the load. The words aren’t even legible on most of these paper fragments, but do the fragments still need to be placed in genizah? Even if Hashem’s holy Names are no longer on the paper, does it still require genizah?

A: In my sefer “Ohel Yaakov: Hilchos Kavod Seforim and Genizah,” I discuss the status of paper on which words of Torah had once been printed but have now faded away, such as facsimile paper, which does not hold the ink well and, over time, completely loses its transmitted text. Does the paper, once the receptacle for kedushah, always retain its kedushah, even when the holy words are gone? Or is its kedushah contingent upon the actual presence of holy words alone?

My rebbe, Maran Harav Avigdor Nevenzahl, shlit”a, is of the opinion that the sanctity remains upon these papers even once the words have disappeared. They therefore do indeed require genizah.

In conclusion, all the pages or pieces of pages plucked out of the laundry should be placed in genizah, whether they have words on them or not.

Harav Yaakov Skoczylas Shlit”a, the Rosh Kollel of Kollel Lihoraah Yerushalayim is the author of the “Ohel Yaakov” series on numerous halachic topics. Harav Skoczylas is highly regarded as a reputable Posek and Moreh Tzedek in Yerushalayim, and receives many halachic inquiries from around the globe seeking his guidance and clarification.

Feel free to reach out to the Bais Horaah with any halacha inquiries by emailing halacha@kollellihoraah.org.

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